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Abstract
Cummings, Emily Suzanne. MA. The University of Memphis. May 2015. The
Impact of Congressional Reforms on the Institution and the Electorate. Major Professor:
Eric Groenendyk.
Institutional and electoral reforms have changed the way in which Congress
works and the electorate votes. Institutional changes include the polarization of parties
and the use of restrictive rules to pass legislation. Electoral reforms include primary
reform and the institution of the invisible primary. Schattschneider (1975) suggested that
the scope of conflict be expanded to include the public more fully. Using the Affordable
Care Act as a case study, institutional reform has complicated the legislative process and
clouded the public’s view. Electoral reforms have not allowed the public increased
control over legislation or election outcomes. From restrictive rules and interwoven
connections to the invisible primary, elites retain control in the post-reform era. Parties
are strong and clearly distinct, yet special interests dominate party behavior.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This thesis is looking at changes in Congress and the electorate to determine who
controls political parties. Institutional changes include the polarization of parties and the
use of restrictive rules to pass legislation. Electoral reforms include primary reform and
the institution of the invisible primary. Using the Affordable Care Act as a case study,
institutional reform has complicated the legislative process and clouded the public’s
view. Electoral reforms have not allowed the public increased control over legislation or
election outcomes. From restrictive rules and interwoven connections to the invisible
primary, elites retain control in the post-reform era. Parties are strong and clearly distinct,
yet special interests dominate party behavior.
Schattschneider (1975) suggested that the scope of conflict be expanded to more
fully include the public. Schattschneider’s critique of the system was that parties kept
conflict private, meaning parties were controlled by special interests. The way to
publicize conflict and overcome special interests is to have responsible parties.
Responsible parties would allow the public to exert its influence. Schattschneider (1975)
envisioned a party system in which parties were responsible to the electorate, instead of
special interests. This party system has not come to fruition in the United States.
Institutional reforms have changed how Congress is run, which impacts the voters and the
American public. Electoral reforms have changed how the public attempts to wield
power. There has been much literature on how Congress works as well as where and
when changes have occurred. The public, the voters do not have enough control over the
outcomes in Congress even though the public oftentimes appears to have more control
than they actually possess. Congress is controlled by the parties, and parties are
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dominated by special interests. For parties to include the electorate by publicizing
conflict should allow the voters increased control in the outcome of elections. The
question is: have these reforms worked? If reforms have worked then conflict is more
public. If reforms have had no effect, or even backfired, then conflict is still in the realm
of private, special interests. Over time, reforms have changed the ways in which voters
interact with parties. This thesis will examine this question by looking at changes in
Congress and changes in election. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) will serve as my case
study.
The party system is structured in a manner which causes parties to attempt to win
a plurality in order to win an election. In this system, the electorate becomes confused or
uncertain of where to assign blame because no party has total control—there is always a
majority and a minority instead of one party being voted to have total control of the
government. The American Political Science Association, along with Schattschneider,
outlined in 1950 the Responsible Parties Thesis (RPT). In the RPT, the electorate would
vote for a party, not a candidate. Whichever party won would receive total control of all
branches of government (Ranney, 1951). Instead, the electorate now votes for
candidates, leaving government with divided control. With two parties constantly in
government, the burden of responsibility is unclear. Interest groups have a much clearer
incentive to follow politics and are able to hold government officials accountable.
Therefore, parties use the special interests of intense policy demanders to form the
foundation of the party structure. It is through the intense policy demands of special
interests that the parties attempt to win a plurality of the vote of the electorate by
convincing the electorate that special interests are in their own interests. However, this
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means that the electorate is not truly influential in the decision-making process within the
party. Although reforms have occurred, the parties are still controlled by the special
interests of intense policy demanders and the electorate is left without a clear place to lay
blame. Party insiders and intense policy demanders have consistently weaved the way to
power despite the various reforms that have occurred over time.
Schattschneider (1975) is often quoted saying—“Government is unthinkable save
parties.” This quote is referenced by some of the most notable names in American
politics. Scholarly research on parties almost invariable cites this quote. Some ask how
parties are organized, some ask what parties do, and some ask where party power is in
Congress. Parties have been a central part of government in the U.S. for many decades.
This has led to many different theories of who parties are and the functions they serve.
Most of the previous literature is focused on the organization in Congress. There have
been reforms through the years to try to make conflict about public interests instead of
special interests. Over the years there have been multiple reforms seeking to publicize
the conflict in the American system. Schattschneider advocated for publicizing the
conflict through parties, by which he meant that the greatest number of people should be
involved.
History of Reforms
Interest groups controlling parties is what Schattschneider (1975) was trying to
get away from by publicizing the scope of the conflict. People who do not participate in
politics are not always indifferent or ignorant—they do not participate because there is
not an avenue for their opinions or needs. Schattschneider (1975) argues that these nonparticipants would be politically active if the conflict changed. He says, “The party
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alignment was so sharply sectional that the bulk of American voters lived in one-party
areas where they had little incentive to vote because they had no choice” (p. 108). Some
areas are still very distinctly sectional, with little (or no) option, leaving voters no
incentive to participate. If the conflict became more public, voters would have an
incentive to participate. As long as interest groups are controlling the parties, the scope
of conflict will be narrowly tailored to special interest groups. Schattschneider wants
party politics to serve as an alternative to special interest politics.
In the history of Congressional organization, one of the most powerful sources of
influence was committee power. The committees ran Congress and chairs ran
committees. This gave smaller groups and individuals more power. Seniority and party
loyalty have been major deciding factors in how committee chairs were appointed at
various points in Congressional history. It was rare that a freshman member would be
able to greatly influence the setup or progress within a committee. Newer members did
not have experience and had not had time to sufficiently prove their loyalty to their party
through methods such as voting record and support of legislation. During this time of
strong committees, Congress was seen as a static, unchanging institution. This became
the foundation upon which some scholars based their critiques. The basic composition of
Congress and its duties has not changed over time—it still consists of a bicameral
legislature, even though there are now more Congressmen than at its inception.
However, the ways in which members work within the two chambers has changed over
time.
Committees were originally thought to hold the most significant power. One
characterization of committee power is that it was primarily negative (Shepsle &
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Weingast, 1987). This sounds ominous but really just means the committee dissuades
anyone from opposing them, instead of encouraging openness or debate. A committee
using power negatively sometimes means a bill is less likely to be stalled on the floor if
legislators work out deals beforehand and are not encouraged to change the policy after it
reaches the floor. Committees and their chairs used several methods for enforcing their
power: “(1) punishment; (2) ex-ante defensive behavior; (3) ex-post defensive behavior”
(Shepsle & Weingast, 1987, p. 88). These powers are used to reinforce the special
interests within parties and Congress.
Another characterization of Congress is based around party power. Power in
Congress flowed from the committee-based to party-based in the late 1900s. Krehbiel
(1993) asserted that parties served the purpose of passing legislation different from what
a no-party Congress would pass, but parties were not exceptionally necessary. He
defines significant party behavior as “behavior that is consistent with known party policy
objectives, but that is contrary to personal preferences” (Krehbiel, 1993, p. 240). What
this basically means is that parties would be more significant if legislators vote in a
partisan manner that did not conflict with personal beliefs. Oftentimes a legislator would
vote against party affiliation if their personal beliefs were not in line with the party.
When a legislator falls in line with the party in spite of personal beliefs, the party holds a
strong influence over legislators in Congress.
Looking at Congress over time, Cox and McCubbins (1993) find that parties, not
committees have had the most power in Congress. Their findings stand in contrast to
scholars like Krehbiel (1993) and Shepsle and Weingast (1987). Krehbiel in particular
stated that it was not the party which had power, but the individuals. Power was seen at
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an individual or committee level, and based on actual people, even in the committee. The
view of parties with power, Cox and McCubbins’ view, is about the group as a whole and
the overarching structure of foundational sameness. When parties are homogenous their
power is greater than when they are heterogeneous. A party is homogenous when most
members share interests and opinions. Parties can wield power through individuals or
committees based on the number of party legislators and the strength of the party.
Aldrich (1995) goes further in his seminal work entitled Why Parties? to discuss
the benefits and extent of party power. Parties exist to resolve the problems within the
system and help government work more efficiently for office-seekers and office-holders.
The first problem parties help overcome is collective action. Parties are able to
efficiently mobilize the electorate around a common goal: electing the party’s candidate.
Strong parties provide a common place for voters to rally in support of common ideals
and values in the form of a candidate. Strong parties determine around which candidate
the electorate will rally. The second problem they help overcome is ambition. Without
parties, as many candidates could run as chose to, but parties only support one candidate
in each general election. This is an intraparty problem. Ambition can lead to splitting the
party, which would be bad for its overall image. The third problem parties help
overcome is cycling coalitions. Without the organized party structure, candidates and
office-holders may not know with whom to align or attempt to cooperate. Parties
establish settled groups of people who can cooperate in election after election, providing
stability in the system. This is an interparty problem. Groups inevitably have to work
with each other, and it is far easier to have a long-established group of groups to work
with than constantly attempting to make compromises each election.
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According to Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller (2008), “Party formation…is
primarily an activity by which intense policy demanders pursue policy goals and
secondarily an activity by which professional politicians achieve careerist and electoral
goals” (emphasis added) (p. 79). Aldrich (1995) ranks these in opposite order, putting
individuals’ careerist goals first, followed by the demands of special interest groups.
These are two competing views of party organization which contribute to the conflicting
views of internal control of parties within the system. Parties are first formed by groups
in order to get certain policies implemented. It is only a secondary consideration that
forming a party allows individuals to serve lengthy terms in office. This is fundamental
to understanding the American party system. Cohen et al. trace the founding of parties
back to the country’s Founders. They themselves were intense policy demanders who
acted like parties, regardless of the fact they urged against party (or faction) formation.
Parties have always been comprised of intense policy demanders.
Bawn et al. (2008) and Cohen et al. (2012) tell a story that stands slightly in
contrast to Aldrich (1995), yet they use the same foundation: Schattschneider. Bawn et
al. start their article by quoting Schattschneider (1975) in saying, “Democracy is
unthinkable save in terms of parties” (p. 571). According to Bawn et al. (and Cohen et
al.), interest groups and activists are the central players of parties and control the effects
of party decision making. Coalitions of interest groups and activists form for the purpose
of joining efforts to ensure that each group gets what it wants, whereas for Aldrich parties
were a coalition for the promotion of a candidate. For Aldrich, parties were for the
purpose of office-seekers and office-holders; For Bawn et al. and Cohen et al, parties are
for the purpose of special interest groups and intense policy demanders. The combining
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of interest groups is a way to prevent cycling coalitions. According to Bawn et al.
(2008), “The long coalition strives to nominate a candidate whom each group trusts to
represent its interests in a manner acceptable to the coalition as a whole” (p. 575).
Cooperation among groups is the most efficient way for each interest group to benefit.
Coalitions do not have much power on the front end to bind candidates to their wishes,
but candidates also know they risk losing electoral support and financial backing if they
ignore the coalition once in office. There is always a trade-off of groups trusting each
other to combine interests and coalitions trusting candidates to promote combined
interests.
Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2010) line up well with Bawn et al. (2012) in their
view that Schattschneider’s (1975) goals have been attempted, but it is an illusion that
conflict has become more public than private. Although this is true, both sets of authors
see that special interests (or extremists) are still very much in control of the running of
government. Fiorina’s assessment shows that the electorate hold opinions that are close
to each other. The influence of special interests pushes candidates into more extreme
positions, which forces voters to elect more extreme candidates than the voters
themselves probably would align with. This is the essential struggle of American
politics—even after the scope of conflict has been publicized special interests are still
dominant in the political arena. Elites and activists are polarized, but the general public
is not.
Pluralism is the view that politics and decision making are located mostly in the
framework of government, but that many non-governmental groups use their resources to
exert influence. This is the way in which special interest groups and intense policy
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demanders insert themselves into the election process and then exert their influence over
the outcome. The central question for classical pluralism is how power and influence are
distributed in a political process. Schickler (2001) identifies the question of pluralism
within American politics. Multiple groups attempt to assert their influence over the
electorate. This becomes disjointed due to the complications and tensions that arise
between various groups when they each attempt to influence an election in their favor
(Schickler, 2001). Schickler says pluralism becomes disjointed because of the dynamics
between interactions and tensions that exist among competing coalitions. The exertion of
influence by various groups creates tension within the legislature and causes coalitions to
compete with one another instead of seeking cooperation.
Instead of opening up avenues for the public, parties have remained dominated by
special interest groups. These groups find a way to work through the system and make
their voice heard over the rest of the electorate. Cohen et al. (2008) refer to special
interest groups as “intense policy demanders” who have particular interests which they
pursue above anything else. Intense policy demanders are: (1) animated by a demand/set
of demands; (2) politically active on behalf of these demands; and (3) numerous enough
to be influential (Cohen et al., 2008, p. 80). Groups join together because it is more
efficient than each group operating on its own. By bringing together groups into one
party, groups can compromise and find one candidate who represents most (or all) of the
interests within the party. By nominating and promoting only one candidate, each group
is more likely to achieve its goals.
Party shifts have been essentially about policy demanders changing or new issues
becoming salient. For example, when Martin Van Buren wanted to form a new national
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party around Andrew Jackson, he did so by appealing to the policy interests of those in
the electorate. Van Buren used the reputation of Jackson to rally broad based support in
the election, Van Buren knew that Jackson could win the election by appealing to the
broad interests of policy demanders. Also, the anti-slavery movement was a major factor
in the formation of the new Republican Party. Supporters came from various existing
parties for the overwhelming policy interest of ending slavery. Van Buren rallied support
of particular interests to boost Jackson’s run at the Presidency. These were two major
changes in the party system, both of which occurred due to intense policy demanders
pursuing their interests through parties.
When intense policy demanders come together under one party, they are forced to
make compromises. While policy is the foremost concern of these groups, their policy
demands will go nowhere without winning elections. This leads groups of policy
demanders to make compromises within the party. The two compromises are: (1) among
conflicting policies and priorities of groups inside the party; and (2) between preferences
of the party groups and the voters. However, sometimes it is impossible for a party to
find a candidate that suits all groups (e.g., The Republicans in 2008 and 2012). A party is
strong when it unifies around one strong candidate which represents the interests of
policy demanders within the party. When a party is winning they are more likely to
nominate a candidate who is more ideologically radical; when a party is losing they are
more likely to nominate a candidate who appeals more to the interests of the public. A
party is strongest when it’s ideologically-driven candidate, supported by a particular
interest group (or a compromised candidate with interests from each special interest
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group) also lines up with the interests of the voters. Then special interest groups are
assured electoral support while also being uninhibited in their policy demands.
One oft-discussed situation of party insiders who failed to catch the appeal of the
public is Hubert Humphrey’s nomination in 1968. Humphrey won the nomination by
appealing to party insiders, and the insiders controlled the delegates. Humphrey never
ran in a primary, meaning the voters were never exposed to him as a candidate. The
party during this time was not actually weak—it was strong enough to overcome what the
voters wanted and nominate a candidate the voters had not chosen. Ultimately this was
not a success as Humphrey lost the race for Presidency, but the loss was not due to a
weak party. The case of Humphrey’s nomination also spurred electoral change. This
electoral change came in the form of voters electing delegates and the candidate having to
win support in many states during primary elections to win nomination. While this may
seem like a success in the electorate controlling the outcome, the power of the party has
only shifted to another frame.
The new frame of party control occurs in attempts to lead the electorate during the
primary season. There has now been the implementation of direct primaries for the
nomination of the candidates. The direct primary is where the electorate is supposed to
be able to cast their votes, and the candidate with the most votes wins the nomination.
However, the implementation of the direct primary has led to the invisible primary. The
invisible primary now holds the power that national conventions once held—this is where
party insiders exert their influence over the electorate for the benefit of the candidate they
wish to nominate. Before the institution of direct primaries, national conventions were a
public display of intense policy demanders fighting over the best candidate. Now, party
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insiders coordinate to throw early support behind the candidate who best fits the needs of
policy demanders within the party. Without party insider support, a candidate cannot win
the nomination and insiders will not support a candidate simply because he or she is
ahead in primary polls. According to Cohen et al. (2008), the invisible primary sets the
agenda for voters. Voters take cues from the party insiders and what most affects the
results is “endorsements by party officials as reported by the media, cash-on-hand at the
start of balloting, and Gallup standing at the end of the invisible primary” (Cohen et al.,
2008, p. 279). Endorsements impact voters more than any other action, which means that
party insiders (not candidates or voters) decide nominations.
This shift in frame is what leads to the illusion that the electorate has control of
the outcome of election. When Humphrey won the nomination, it caused the electorate to
attempt to regain control of the power to control the outcome of nomination and election.
It was after Humphrey’s nomination that the electorate gained the power to directly
nominate the candidates for general election. This has led to the invisible primary. The
invisible primary is the way in which the special interest groups now control the
nomination process. Special interest groups, either alone or together, promote a
candidate to the public in an effort for the candidate to win the nomination. The
nomination, though coming directly from the electorate, is implicitly driven by the
special interest groups.
Instead of shifting the scope of conflict to the public as Schattschneider (1975)
wanted, the changes in Congress have shifted the power among groups within the
institution. Institutional reforms sometimes spill over into the realm of voters. The era of
Gingrich Senators (late 1980s-present) has been filled with institutional changes which
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have effected, but were not instigated by, the electorate. When Newt Gingrich was
elected to the House, he almost immediately began to move the Republican Party in a
more conservative direction. Office-holders who served in the House with Gingrich were
more likely to be more conservative than their party-mates and they are more likely to
keep their seat in the Senate once they have achieved it. Gingrich Senators are
champions of partisan warrior mentality which exists in the Senate today. On the
Gingrich Senators, Theriault (2013) says, “Not only were their needs different, but the
entire institution of the Senate was, indeed, different because of them” (p. 170). Since
Gingrich Senators came from the House, they developed different styles of legislation
and working together within the system. This translated to the Senate in a unique way,
which helped lead the parties into polarization.
The Gingrich Senators are exemplary of strong parties who impact the way a
party runs (Aldrich’s endogenous institution). Party players are shaped by those running
for office and party insiders who support candidates. The party and the way it operates is
changed by the people within the party. Gingrich Senators also are a strong party unit
which attempt to hold control over party members in Congress. Along the lines of Cox
and McCubbins (1993), when the Gingrich Senators have control, the party is
homogenous, and the party is more successful in elections and in Congress. When the
Gingrich Senators became only a fraction of the Republican Party in the more recent
elections, the party was heterogeneous, leading the party to do poorly in elections. Now
Gingrich Senators have been joined in their partisan warfare by the Tea Party. These two
groups have forced the Republican Party to the right, and further away from the
Democratic Party. This makes compromise harder, but “for the Republican Party, a ‘Do
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Nothing’ Senate achieves the joint objectives of stalling liberal policy changes and of
showcasing the Democratic majority’s incompetence” (Theriault, 2013, p. 173). The
partisan warfare of today’s Congress was driven by the Gingrich Senators and the
Democrats’ response to their tactics. The Senators had very specific policy interests
which prompted a coalition of like-minded Republicans to internally change the workings
of the Senate. The intense policy demands are funneled through the legislators who work
together to promote their particular interests within the Senate.
If Congress is now heavily partisan, what effect does this have on the electorate?
In “Culture War?” Fiorina et al. (2010) make an early distinction between the political
class and the public. The political class consists of candidates, office-holders, political
activists, interest group leaders, and political infotainers. In opposition stands the public,
who are generally less engaged than the political class. Overall, the political class has
much more at stake in the political arena which pushes their actions in a more extreme
direction. However, the public is also viewed generally as extreme. Fiorina and his coauthors want to discover why the electorate is seen as polarized and what the impacts of
this are. While their claim is not that the public is polarized, the polarization within
Congress fuels the outcome of legislation and the ways in which parties operate.
The informed political class is highly polarized, which leads to polarized
candidates being placed before the public. Fiorina et al. (2010) assert that “close
elections may reflect equal numbers of voters who hate one candidate and love the other,
voters who like or dislike both, voters who don’t care much at all about either candidate,
or various combinations of these conditions” (p. 15). When those in politics are highly
divided, it does not give the electorate much option. Candidates and office-holders are
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representative of the political class who are highly involved in the political process.
While party identification does indicate growing differences in the electorate, the authors
attribute this to voters correctly identifying themselves now, whereas they incorrectly
identified in the past (this is sorting). Moderate voters also help in electing highly
partisan candidates since there are few (or no) other choices.
According to these authors, “elites nominate the candidates and set the agenda,
and voters respond” (Fiorina et al., 2010, p. 166). Elites are the informed political
class—this is where the culture war exists, not in the public. To incorporate
Schattschneider’s (1975) view that government should publicize conflict, the authors here
say that the conflict has not reached the public. It is only the elites involved in the
conflict—the public is still on the outskirts. The political class and extremists, the
interest groups, are still in control of who runs for office and what happens in
government. Fiorina suggests one way to rectify this is to incorporate greater numbers of
citizens to encourage more mainstream debates, instead of highly polarized special
interest debates. However, there are complications in mobilizing more of the electorate
to participate in government. Fiorina et al. offer no hard solutions, just a number of
possibilities, such as increases in technology is potentially one way to incorporate more
voters into the system. As the public becomes increasingly disappointed with those in
power an additional party is potentially a solution as well.
Coming full circle back to Schattschneider (1975), many of the reforms in recent
years have been attempts at tipping the balance of power by engaging new people in the
scope of the conflict. Parties attract members through the conflict of focus at the time.
Schattschneider says, “All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the
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exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organization
is the motivation of bias” (p. 69). This means that each party focuses on the conflicts it
handles well, the conflicts for which it has the most support. Lack of voter participation
is not due to indifference or ignorance. It is a lack of avenue for the opinions or needs of
those not participating. Party organization is also a means for channeling the electorate
into politics. Reforms in Congress have been attempts at organization and electoral
reforms have been attempts at publicizing conflict. These two working together should
have caused the electorate to have control over the outcomes of politics, but the outcomes
are still largely controlled by the internal workings of parties.
Voting in Congress has become almost exclusively partisan on any salient issue of
conflict. This extreme partisanship does allow the electorate to assign blame to which
party they believe is responsible for the passage of particular legislation. Even those who
are not immersed in the everyday goings-on of politics or Congress often see the results
of major votes, which tend to be highly partisan. Fiorina et al. (2010) discuss the
polarization of Congress that has led to the partisanship of voting records. This
partisanship is a change of which Schattschneider (1975) would approve, but it has not
had the impact Schattschneider would have expected. With polarization and the ease of
identifying responsibility in voting on legislation, the electorate, according to
Schattschneider, should have gained control over the outcomes of Congress. With
obvious splits between the parties, special interests and intense policy demanders can
coordinate around one when the other is displeasing. However, there has been a constant
struggle between the parties to gain full control of government.
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Implications
So, what happened? Where did Schattschneider’s (1975) prediction fall short and
what caused the discrepancy between his theory and reality? The polarization of parties
has not caused the electorate to band together in response to party politics. The electorate
is not consistent in electing one party wholly into government then wholly voting them
out. The electorate has also been unable to fully grasp control of parties, leaving intense
policy demanders to battle for dominance within the parties. This leaves the electorate
with conflicting opinions about who actually is to blame. Parties conflict both within
Congress and in the general political sphere, including everything from local elections to
opinions on current events. This constant conflict is not compatible with the theory of
responsible parties. The public cannot always easily lay the blame on one party, which
makes it easier for parties to continue conflicting with one another. With the electorate
still unsure of who to blame, the parties retain the power to make decisions in their own
interests. These interests are compromises between the special interests which comprise
a party, adding complexity to determining responsibility. It is not responsible parties as
Schattschneider envisioned, but strong parties through which the electorate cannot see.
Chronological assessments of reforms and changes over time have been primarily
restricted to institutional reforms or electoral reforms. These reforms exist within the
same system and influence both Congress and the electorate regardless of the type of
reform. Both Congress and the public are essentially tied to one another and cannot
operate as mutually exclusive. Analyzing these separately does not allow for adequate
analyses of the way the reforms have affected the system. Institutional reforms impact
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the electorate and electoral reforms impact the institution. It is necessary to analyze these
reforms in accordance with one another, not simply by themselves.
Intense policy demanders, interest groups, party insiders—these are essentially all
the same group and stands in opposition to the public. They are groups with private,
particular interests that are attempting to wield party power in a manner that suits their
purposes. When reforms occur or the scope of conflict is publicized, intense policy
demanders usurp any power that can be taken up by the general electorate and use it to
manipulate the process so their own interests are met. For example, after the McGovernFraser reforms, the balance of power shifted. Party insiders had previously worked
through formal institutions, but post-reform insiders now use informal means for
candidate promotion in accordance with their special interests (Cohen et al., 2012).
Office-holders in Congress since the Newt Gingrich era have become less individual and
more partisan, which has led to polarized parties that act in the interests of those who
propel the party interests (Theriault, 2011). As individuals become more partisan, the
interests of the intense policy demanders in the party become more homogenous. The
shifting away from individuality toward partisanship drive the policy demands of the
special interests which comprise the party structure. This cycle of special interest
domination followed by reform followed by special interest domination is preventing the
electorate from having power over outcomes of Congress.
It is not important to pinpoint exactly where this cycle begins—it is only
important that the cycle exists. Intense policy demanders control the parties which are
polarized in Congress. The electorate is left following the will of polarized parties
because that is the only choice they have. The electorate is presented with two options,
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driven by special interests that have previous compromised to form a coalition. The
electorate splits into two sides since they are not given any other option or middle ground
to occupy. It is unclear what will break the cycle—reforms have consistently fallen back
into the hands of intense policy demanders. However, a voter-oriented system would
allow the electorate to control the sway of parties, both as an institution and in the
legislative process.
Parties are good for forming lasting coalitions around which voters can gather, but
parties controlled by special interests are not helpful to the electorate. With the
implementation of the direct primary, the electorate should have gained control of inside
party functions. Nominating the candidate of their choosing would be a way for the
electorate to control the outcome in government. However, the party insiders simply
reworked their methods and now bond together around a particular candidate to present
as a favorite to the public during primary season. Intense policy demanders depend on
their control of candidate choice for promoting their interests in Congress. The general
electorate does not have all the same interests as particular groups and will not make all
the same compromises with other groups. Intense policy demanders ensure the candidate
of their choosing wins the party nomination, even though voters are supposed to have
control in primaries.
The ebb and flow of power within Congress has not fundamentally changed.
Even when parties are not heavily dominant, they are still the guiding force behind what
goes on in the legislature. Whether there is a strong party leader or strong cohesion, the
conflict is still inherently internalized within the party. Party strength does determine the
amount to which the conflicts are evident outside the institution, but the internal structure
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has not changed all that much. Parties have consistently retained power over the
outcomes of Congress. It is party insiders who influence caucus members who push the
nominees, making the nominees representative of the special interests who get them
elected. Office holders determine policy positions by the coalition of special interests
upon which they depend for election. Sometimes the coalition is strong and sometimes it
is weak, but it is always a coalition of special interests, not public interests. Without
public interests taking the foreground in the legislature, the electorate would not have
power over the outcomes.
It could be argued that special interest groups are representative of the most
salient public interests, but this is not the case. Intense policy demanders do not consider
the public interest when making their demands. Policy interests and party insiders are
focused on an individualistic goal, even if there are different interests driving the goal.
Having multiple goals or reasons for particular policies should not be confused with the
public interest. Each person has competing interests upon which to base policy decisions.
Candidates are chosen by holding interests similar to the special interest groups within
the party. By having multiple interests, a candidate can appeal to the variety of intense
policy demanders that are present within either party. Since candidates are representative
of the special interests, one party’s candidate necessarily stands in contrast to the other
party’s. Special interests come together and compromise to form a party, which means
interests which stand in contrast to each other, are more likely to align with the opposite
party.
Theriault (2013) defines Gingrich as an intense policy demander as well as an
ambitious office-seeker and office-holder. By following Gingrich’s lead, other
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Republicans made more intense policy demands. When an intense policy demander also
happens to be a candidate, such as Gingrich, the parties are likely to polarize even further.
The demands made on one side are nearly always matched by the other side. By
incorporating competing special interests, the parties set themselves up for conflict in the
legislature. Policies implemented under the Gingrich Senators were typically met by
Democratic policies when they were in power. Party power rises and falls over the
course of time. Intense policy demanders attempt to go as far as they can in their policy
demands when they have power in Congress. As Fiorina et al. (2010) found, most voters
did not identify as polarized as the electorate, but polarized parties are what voters were
given. If parties were representative of the electorate’s interests, parties would not be as
polarized. Polarization occurs due to the intense policy demanders. Reforms occur to
diffuse polarization and it comes right back. It is necessary to break the cycle of policy
demanders and party insiders usurping the power in parties from the electorate.
Conclusion
Congress has experienced reforms over time. These reforms have been caused by
a variety of things and have had a variety of impacts. Elections have also experienced
changes over time which have impacted the electorate. The binding force behind all the
reforms and outcomes, though, is the intense policy demanders who want to create
certain effects in the legislature. While these also ebb and flow over time, they are always
present in the election system. Much of the literature has assessed either Congressional
reforms or electoral reforms. However, these two things must be considered together to
analyze the full impact on the institution of Congress.
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Chapters 2 and 3 use the Affordable Care Act as a case study through both
institutional and electoral reforms. The ACA is a conservative test because the issue high
profile so the public was aware of it, it occurred recently, and was an important piece of
legislation. The electorate was aware that health care reform was a major topic for
parties and candidates. Chapter 2 looks at changes in elections and examines how
reforms have been insufficient to take power away from special interests. Reform of the
primary system has led to the invisible primary, in which special interests promote a
candidate of their liking to the electorate. Chapter 3 looks at changes within Congress
and how special interests and intense policy demanders use the party structure within
Congress to achieve their goals. Schattschneider (1975) thought that having strong,
responsible parties would publicize conflict, but the electorate is still edged out by special
interests.
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Chapter 2: Changes Outside
This chapter is looking at changes in elections. Primary election reform in
particular has been a source of special interests domination, despite attempts at handing
power to the electorate. By expanding the scope of conflict, the public should be able to
hold parties responsible by ensuring that what the electorate wants is what the parties do.
Reforms have been made outside of the institution of Congress in order to transfer power
to the electorate. The power the electorate was attempting to gain is the power to
determine campaign and legislation outcomes. This is an essential component of
Schattschneider’s theory of expanding the scope of conflict. Primary reform was the best
attempt at allowing the electorate to hold parties accountable to their interests. The direct
primary deciding who would receive the nomination was an attempt to hold the party
accountable to the electorate. Instead, special interests have created the invisible primary
by pushing their own interests before and during the primary to sway the electorate into
voting for the special interest groups’ candidate. The invisible primary is the process
through which special interest groups promote a candidate to the public to ensure the
candidate best for those special interests win the nomination. This is done subtly so the
electorate does not realize special interests are influencing their decision. The electorate
does not realize elites are leading the electorate through the invisible primary, allowing
special interests to dominate through the primary seasons.
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) was a prominent piece of legislation about which
the public was constantly flooded with information. Special interests, including
pharmaceutical companies, hospitals, and insurance agencies, lobbied to and campaigned
for Congressmen, then used their influence to create legislation which would benefit their
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own interests. The ACA should have been determined by the electorate—the electorate
was aware of the bill and the bill began as publically oriented proposal yet special
interests dominated the process. Since the electorate could not overcome special interest
groups during this process, it shows that the electorate is largely powerless to determine
what parties do.
Electoral Reform
The notorious case of Hubert Humphrey’s nomination in 1968 spurred some
critics to question the electoral system. Humphrey won the nomination by appealing to
insiders. Insiders controlled the delegates enough to achieve their nomination even
though voters never got the chance to vote for Humphrey in a primary. Humphrey did
not campaign to the electorate yet won the nomination by winning the support of party
insiders who chose the candidate. This caused a fundamental shift in the way candidates
were nominated. Direct primaries were the way for the electorate to control the candidate
nomination. The electorate was displeased when Humphrey won the nomination without
having had to appeal to them, but won by relying instead on party insiders. The primary
election was established to allow the public to choose a candidate for themselves, instead
of a candidate being chosen based on appealing to party insiders. Instead of the party
deciding to whom the nomination goes, candidates now must go before the public to
campaign for the nomination.
In 2008, the primary process and the campaign tour was a great way for the
Democratic candidates to establish before the public the goals each candidate has for if
they are elected. Health care reform was among the top priorities of both candidates.
Although Hilary Clinton had more insider support in the beginning, Obama slowly
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gained insider support as the primary went on. During the primary season and throughout
his campaign, Obama made overhaul of the health care system one of his main priorities.
In early 2009, shortly after he took office, President Obama began the push to pass health
care reform legislation (Cannan, 2013). While his commitment to change made him
popular with the electorate, and Clinton had a sizable initial lead in insider support, the
endorsement of Democrats who were well-known and had been key players for former
President Bill Clinton and former candidate John Edwards helped President Obama win
the support of delegates, the crucial element to winning the Democratic nomination.
Cohen et al. (2008) traces the history of intense policy demanders to the Founders
through modern parties, demonstrating the need for appeal to insiders over the public.
Even though the Founders were against parties, they acted like parties. The Founders
focused on policy, not the public. The Founders were not concerned about having long
careers, but about specific policies. Particularly after papers became the popular way of
presenting politics to the public, non-office seekers started trying to influence politics.
Thus, parties were not driven by ambitious office-seekers/holders, but by policy
demanders. As stated earlier, Cohen et al. (2008) say that the primary reason for party
formation is to achieve intense policy demands. Parties formed around the Founders as
a way to implement policies. Interests are held together within the party system which
allows for intense policy demanders to achieve policy goals, first and foremost. The
ambition of politicians is offered an avenue through the party, but this is only a
secondary consideration. The electoral interests of politicians is determined in part by
interest groups.
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Health care reform has made a few appearances in the past few Presidential
cycles. Former President Clinton made an attempt at health care reform, which failed.
Several times in recent Congresses health care legislation has been discussed, but has
never had much impact and nothing of significance has been introduced or passed.
Although President Obama championed health care reform (the ACA is colloquially
named Obamacare), its progress was pushed by lobbyists and party leaders, not the
public. The ACA passed on March 21, 2010. Within a week, Gallup released a poll of
Americans’ opinions. Approval overall was right about half (49%), but was deeply split
between parties. Democrats approved by an overwhelming majority (79%) while an
almost equally overwhelming majority of Republicans disapproved (76%). In the same
poll, Gallup compared the overall reactions to emotional reactions showing “50%
enthusiastic or pleased versus 42% angry or disappointed” (Saad, 2010). Overall ratings
show approximately half of the nation as approving and emotionally positive toward the
ACA in the immediate environment surrounding its passage and signing into law. When
asked about particular aspects of the bill, the electorate is even less enthused. Only 39%
approve of the individual mandate (Seman, 2014) and 18 % of those who disapprove do
so specifically because of the individual mandate (DiJulio, Firth, & Brodie, 2015).
Other than the individual mandate, most of the public remains ignorant of what is
included or how it would affect them (DiJulio et al., 2015). This was hailed as a victory
for President Obama and the Democratic Party, even though public opinion was not
positive and many Americans are unhappy with part, or all, of the ACA.
According to Cohen et al. (2008) parties are controlled by intense policy
demanders. These people (or groups) are given three basic characteristics: (1) animated
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by a demand/set of demands; (2) politically active on behalf of these demands; and (3)
numerous enough to be influential (Cohen et al., 2008). Interest groups like these
attempt to influence every aspect of party politics they can. This means that parties are
simply a means to an end for policy demanders. The electoral blind spot allows
parties/groups/officeholders to make moves which voters would not necessarily approve,
but the electorate does not notice. Since the electorate has such a blind spot, elected
officials become accountable to specials interest groups instead of the constituents.
Interest groups within the party work together to promote a candidate who will represent
the interests of each particular group.
Lobbyists for pharmaceutical companies were hugely influential during the
negotiation and implementation of the ACA. When the ACA passed, polls showed
higher levels of support than later. Around the time of the ACA’s implementation
Gallup found that, “Americans believe[d] the new legislation will make things worse
rather than better for the U.S. as a whole, as well as for them personally, are consistent
with previous Gallup polls” (Roberts, 2011). If the public had been involved in the
negotiation of the ACA, there should have been much greater approval of the bill than
there was. The public was in favor of health care reform generally, but was unaware of
most of the details involved in the ACA. Interest groups and Congressmen worked out
the details amongst themselves, which explains why the electorate likes health care
reform overall, but does not like the particulars.
Each party has to find a nominee who satisfies most or all the groups in the
coalition. There are two compromises made when selecting a candidate: (1) among
conflicting policies and priorities of groups inside the party; and (2) between preferences
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of the party groups and the preferences of voters (Cohen et al, 2008). A party is strong
when it unifies around one strong candidate instead of allowing a candidate to overcome
party insiders. The invisible primary is the means for party insiders to promote their
candidate to the public. Although the electorate does vote on the nominated candidates,
party insiders use the invisible primary to promote their candidate and ensure that
candidate wins the primary election. By utilizing the invisible primary, intense policy
demanders can work within the party to comprise and choose the best candidate for their
policy demands. After settling internally, the candidate is promoted by party insiders
during the primary election. This leads the electorate into voting for the candidate chosen
by the party insiders.
Party insiders choosing a candidate indicates the polarized position of insiders and
special interests. The electorate then chooses the candidate who has been promoted by
these elites. Although it has been widely accepted that polarization is occurring in
Congress, there remains debate over polarization in the electorate. Some literature finds
that the electorate simply adopts the positions of elites (Zaller, 1992). Some studies have
found that elite discourse polarizes issues opinions in the electorate (Carmines &
Stimson, 1989). Schattschneider (1975) said that the incorporation of new issues or
changing positions draws in new crowds. The analysis of party platforms has shown that
party leaders have polarized, particularly since 1980, and that platforms which used to
focus on the median voter now focus on median partisans (Jordan, Webb, & Wood,
2014). Promotion of a candidate derives from party leaders and elites who want voters in
the primary to support their candidate. Whether or not the electorate is actually
polarized, it receives information from elites and party platforms, which impact the
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decision of voters when selecting candidates in the primary. When party insiders and
interests groups present a candidate during the primary, that candidate is a representation
of the elites’ polarized opinions. Instead of public conflict, party insiders want to keep
from drawing in new crowds, but simply appease the crowds with the candidate of their
own choosing.
Just as intense policy demanders force their hand during the primary season, they
also use their sway with major legislation. Most polls show a nearly even number, or a
majority, of Americans disapproving of the ACA. Except that, when separated by party,
most Democrats approve of the ACA and most Republicans disapprove of the ACA.
Some public opinion experts were particularly concerned over the idea that the White
House and the Democratic Party was so eager in their enthusiasm toward a 49% approval
rate. Anderson (2010) voices this concern saying it “further demonstrates [the White
House’s] disconnect from the American people.” One of Anderson’s main critiques of
the Gallup poll’s results is due to the methods—Gallup surveyed random adults, not
likely voters. This makes a difference when compared to a poll conducted of likely
voters.
In a poll of voters, there is a much different story than Gallup’s poll of American
adults in general. According to this poll conducted around the same time by CNN
(Barbieri, 2010), 59% of Americans disapprove of the ACA, which is a 10-point different
from the overall approval reported in the Gallup poll (Anderson, 2010). The disapproval
is whittled down to two primary reasons: 1) the belief that it will raise the deficit (70%);
and 2) the belief that the overall cost of health would be raised (62%). These ratings of
disapproval and the reasons behind it are more drastic than the Gallup poll divulged. The

29

CNN poll showed a much more negative view of the ACA and the potential impacts it
would have on the nation. These voters who are expressing such negative opinions are
the people that parties should be listening to. If parties were listening to the voters, there
should not be such high rates of disapproval. Given that the Gallup poll showed only
49% approval and the CNN poll showed 59% disapproval, the White House has less
reason to be pleased with the results than they were.
Surveying voters instead of all Americans is important because voters are most
likely to be engaged and politically aware. It is a grim picture when the approval rate is
lower than the majority, but with a higher rate of disapproval in a poll of voters the
picture looks worse. Those who are most likely to be able to hold parties responsible
have been unable to do so with the ACA. Special interests have overridden the opinions
of the electorate in general, and voters in particular have been displeased with the
outcome. Instead of the parties being held accountable to the opinions of those who elect
them into office, the low approval rate demonstrates that parties are listening more to
special interests than voters or the electorate.
The Invisible Primary
Invisible primaries have replaced party convention bargaining. Party insiders
have to coordinate before and during the invisible primary. A candidate might not be any
group’s ideal choice, but might be acceptable to most or all of the groups within the
party. Parties want a candidate they can trust to uphold the special interests for their
groups. Cohen et al. (2008) find three actions occurring within the invisible primary: (1)
A candidate alone cannot win the nomination, but has to have insider support; (2)
Candidates who usually receive a lot of one-time supporters usually do not win the favor
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of party insider; and (3) Factional candidates usually do not win party insider support.
Since the McGovern-Fraser reforms, party insiders and special interests are the crucial
aspects to a candidate winning a nomination. However, party insiders will not get behind
a candidate simply because the candidate is out in front in a primary. The public often
votes for whomever the party insiders favor and throw their support behind. Winning
insider support is the single most important factor for a candidate winning the party
nomination.
The two candidates who received the nominations in 2008 both proposed health
care reforms. Then Senators John McCain and Barack Obama both responded to the
electorate’s general sentiment that health care needed an overhaul. According to one
survey, “voters [were] calling for change: eight of 10 adults said in a May [of 2008]
survey that the health care system is in need of a major overhaul or fundamental reform”
(Collins, Davis, Nicholson, & Rustgi, 2008). Health care was a very hot topic amidst the
2008 campaign and election, and candidates appeared to be responding to the electorate,
but interest group influence dominated the health care debate. The candidates’ responses
were tailored to what the electorate desired, but at the end of the day, the interest groups
influenced the legislation process in favor of special interests without much regard to
campaign promises. Although both candidates were attempting to win a majority of
votes in the election, the campaign promises had to be mindful of what party insiders
wanted for health care reform, not of what the electorate wanted.
Party insiders select candidates that will appeal broadly to their groups. Early
support for a candidate comes from party leaders and insiders. The invisible primary sets
the agenda for voters. When a candidate is given support from party leaders, the
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electorate is drawn to that candidate. Endorsements are a good indication of the early
national conversation. When a candidate is endorsed by party insiders, it shows that there
has been discussion regarding who the insiders want to receive the nomination. This also
prompts the electorate to consider candidates who have received endorsements as more
viable choices. Those giving the endorsement intend to support the candidate of their
choice—not necessarily the candidate who would be best for the majority of the
electorate. Cohen et al. (2008) offer four measures of conversation between elites and the
electorate: (1) endorsements; (2) media coverage; (3) fundraising; and (4) public opinion
polls. These measures provide various ways for party insiders to promote their candidate
and see how the electorate is responding to the candidate. Once a candidate has been
endorsed, this impacts the media coverage and fundraising opportunities, which then
impact the public opinion; “endorsements by party officials as reported in the media,
cash-on-hand at the start of balloting, and Gallup standing at the end of the invisible
primary affect overall results in the primaries and caucuses” (Cohen et al., 2008, p. 279).
The invisible primary allows party insiders to promote their candidate to the electorate
then influence the candidate’s chances at winning the nomination. Candidates strive for
the insider endorsements by promoting certain policy positions, which shapes the
candidates platform during the primary season. The initial endorsement in the invisible
primary has the greatest impact on voters.
As voters follow the direction given by party insiders during the invisible
primary, the electorate begins to look like the elites. When a particular candidate is
accepted by the electorate, that candidate becomes the representation of the electorate,
regardless of whether or not the electorate holds positions as extreme as the candidate.
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Parties have also become more homogenous (conservative Republicans and liberal
Democrats with little to nothing in between) which has led the electorate to follow the
polarization trend (Garand, 2010). The electorate is not as polarized as Congress, but
they are portrayed as polarized. The influence of party insiders in the invisible primary
promotes a candidate with particular positions, which forces voters to elect candidates
with whom the electorate would not necessarily align (Fiorina et al., 2010). Polarization
is a reflection of the intense policy demanders promoting a candidate in the invisible
primary, making that candidate seem like the best and most viable option to the
electorate.
Primary Elections
The post-McGovern-Fraser reform primary process was established to give the
electorate control over which candidate won the nomination. Instead of the party
deciding who won the nomination, primary elections were reformed so that the voters
could choose between multiple candidates. The McGovern-Fraser reforms were
supposed to make the process more democratic. Candidates engage in trade-offs during
the primary process between: (1) capturing media attention; (2) delegate acquisition; and
(3) eliminating rivals (Norrander, 1996). Candidates have to decide which element of the
primary process to focus on at various points over the primary season. Between trying to
secure both the electorate and party insiders, candidates split their focus between the
media and other primary goals such as public speaking and fundraising.
The primary was an attempt to publicize the conflict by allowing the public to
control the nomination, rather than party insiders holding secret meetings to decide the
nomination among themselves. The primary election for presidential nominees should
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allow the electorate to determine the best candidate who would then receive the official
nomination and support of each party. Momentum is gained in the primary season when
early victories point a candidate toward winning the nomination and voters throw their
support behind the candidate. Norrander (1996) says primaries provide incomplete
information and are based on interactions between engaged voters, activists, and elites.
These interactions are what prompt early support for one candidate over another. Starting
in the invisible primary, party insiders promote their preferred candidate to other elites
and activists. The electorate picks up on this support, particularly through the media, and
momentum is thrown behind one candidate (Norrander, 1996). While candidates still
have to woo the public, most of the work occurs through the assurance of party insider
support. Particularly delegate acquisition and the elimination of rivals is achieved when
the electorate follows the support of the party insiders.
Most of the literature assumes primaries have a singular definition or method of
implementation. Since states are responsible for setting primary rules and regulations,
there is great variety within the country. Open primaries allow any registered voter to
vote in a primary election. Modified primaries allow a registered voter to choose in
which primary to vote. Closed primaries allow only registered party members to vote in
the primary election. States use different combinations of types of primaries, with no
consensus or regulation from the federal level. Closed primaries tend to be the most
extreme, forcing candidates away from the median voter and toward the most extreme
side of the party whereas the modified primary “may weaken party control over the
nomination process, it…results in more moderate and more representative primary
electorates” (Kaufmann, Gimpel, & Hoffman, 2003, p. 457). Open primaries allow for
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the possibility of victory for more moderate candidates. Parties in different states have to
accommodate the primary systems. The various types of primaries clearly allows for
varying influence of party insiders on the electorate.
How do Congressional candidates handle the different types of primaries? In an
open primary, a candidate might be inclined to appeal to moderates or the general
electorate, but very few (14) states hold open primaries. But in a closed or modified
primary, a candidate is more inclined to appeal to party extremists. It is not strategic for
them to volley between the general electorate during the general election and the party
extremes during the primary (Brady, Han, & Pope, 2007). Candidates face a decision at
the beginning of the primary season, knowing that states will hold various types of
primaries, whether to appeal to moderates and the general electorate or extremes.
Candidates face this strategic dilemma in the primary season, and most choose to cater
their campaign to the more extreme primary voters (Brady et al., 2007). Primary voters
as a whole tend to be more extreme than the general electorate. Primary voters also
follow the party insider preferences established in the invisible primary. Taken together,
this shows that the electorate has minimal control over the outcome of the nomination
process. Not only are party insiders attempting to determine the election from the onset,
the candidates appeal to the more extreme section of loyal party voters.
Perhaps the most succinct description of the problem is this: “Party leaders seem
to find clever ways of regaining control in spite of the reforms that were aimed at
reducing their influence” (Kaufmann et al., 2003). Electoral reforms were attempts at
changing control from special interests to the public interests. Instead of this happening,
the party leaders and intense policy demanders have found ways to implicitly control the
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outcome of the election. The McGovern-Fraser reforms simply changed the balance of
power. Party insiders used to work through formal institutions, but post-reform insiders
now use informal means for supporting a candidate.
Campaigns & Legislation
How much was the ACA used during the last campaign? How was the
Republican Party impacted by a fully Democratic controlled Congress and Presidency?
While the ACA passed during a Democratic controlled government, the 112th Congress
saw a change to a Republican majority in the House. Was this perhaps due to early signs
of displeasure with the passage of the ACA? The Republican Party gained large amounts
of support in campaigns from health care interest groups who were unhappy with the
passage, or certain parts of the content, of the ACA.
This section relies heavily on Gallup polls. Gallup polls are widely used to
establish the overall opinion of citizens on a variety of issues, particularly during political
campaigns. Over the past several years, Gallup, as well as others, has done much
research on the ACA as a whole, as well as more minute aspects of health care and the
approval the legislation and implementation. By surveying the electorate, pollsters try to
find an accurate representation of public opinion.
In 2013, Jose Delreal did a brief breakdown of polling to show more precisely
who approved (or disapproved) of the ACA, plus how and why the approval rating
fluctuates. According to Delreal, one of the most apparent splits is down party lines.
Seventy-five percent of Democrats approve of the ACA while approximately 30% of
Republicans approve. This wide split is highly reminiscent of what has come to be
expected in most national issues—Republicans on one side, Democrats on the other, with
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almost nothing in between. The electorate, despite the fluctuations of opinion, remain
split along party lines, showing the influence of party leaders to dictate the electorate’s
opinions. At the time of this survey in 2013, approval was approximately at 40%,
meaning the majority of the nation did not approve of the ACA. This came just after
healthcare.gov first opened for registration. While the utter dishevelment of the
registration process was sure to cause some discontent, the approval rating did not change
drastically. The approval months before and just after the first attempt at registration was
between ten percentage points, with a constant majority disapproving the legislation.
This poll of the electorate shows the electorate following closely with the
opinions of Congressmen from each party—about two-thirds of Democrats approve and
Republicans disapprove. The low approval rating also suggests that the electorate might
be more willing to choose candidates who were opposed to the ACA, which explains part
of the shift to a Republican controlled House during the 112th Congress. The Republican
Party consciously reached out to voters based on the low approval of the ACA in order to
get a greater number of Republicans elected in order to further the special interests in
opposition to the ACA. Who is leading whom is a difficult question, but the interest
groups unhappy with the ACA had great incentive to back the Republican Party and get
more Republicans in office. Republicans, and the special interests that support them,
convinced the electorate to vote in more Republicans, thus ousting enough Democrats to
achieve a Republican controlled House. Those special interests which sought changes to,
or the complete repeal of, the ACA needed to get Republicans into office. Republicans in
Congress were so outnumbered by the Democrats during the passage of the ACA that the
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next election cycle saw a spur of Republicans winning elections based on the dismay at
the ACA.
One poll underscores the variety of opinion on the ACA, with some Americans
saying it is President Obama’s greatest achievement and others saying it is his greatest
failure. Democrats (and Democratic leaners) are highly likely to say Obamacare is his
greatest achievement, while Republicans and Democrats are highly likely to say it is
greatest failure (Newport, 2013). Although it is mostly Democrats who say this is his
biggest achievement, Democrats are about as likely as Republicans to say it is his greatest
failure. However, nearly as many respondents (23%) say nothing is his greatest
achievement as healthcare being his greatest achievement (22%). It is an even larger
percentage of respondents who say this is his greatest failure (36%). Based on this poll,
more Americans believe this is a failure than a success. How did the bill pass by such a
majority in Congress when most Americans believe it is a failure? The legacy of
President Obama’s success, or failure, with healthcare cannot be fully determined yet.
Just as other controversial issues were settled years after a President’s term, the ACA is
relatively novel and its outcome cannot be fully decided.
The passage of a bill with such a large number of voters disapprove of
demonstrates the lack of ability the electorate has in determining the outcome of
legislation. The public wanted health care reform, but special interests determined the
details of the bill. Reminiscent of the argument made by Cohen et al. (2008), the parties
in Congress sought first to implement particular legislation. The primary goal of many
Democrats in Congress was to pass health care reform with as little compromise to the
Republican Party as possible. This caused the Republican Party to mobilize based on the
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goal of defeating the ACA. Republicans successfully convinced enough voters that the
details of the bill are a problem. The public initially wanted health care reform, but now
are unhappy with the outcome of the ACA. Interests groups led the electorate to the
Republican Party as a way to reform the health care legislation passed by a Democratic
Congress. Ultimately, the Republicans in Congress have not yet succeed in repealing the
ACA, even as its popular support declined.
Democrats and Republicans who cite the ACA as President Obama’s biggest
failure cite different reasons for its failure. In the same poll as when asked what
President Obama’s greatest achievement and failure are, “Republicans cite Obama's lack
of communication and lack of leadership as a failure, while Democrats mention his
inability to get along with Congress and Republicans, his lack of communication, and
lack of leadership” (Newport, 2013). Newport suggests that with the ACA publically
deemed Obamacare, the ultimate definition of his success or failure will depend on his
ability to overcome what Americans deem failure and turn healthcare into an avenue of
success. Again, the primary goal of Democratic Party was to pass this legislation,
approved by most Congressmen within the Party. Even though the Democrats lost the
majority in the House in the subsequent election, the party goal of passing health care
reform was the foremost concern.
Even though more Americans have insurance now than before the ACA, most
Americans remain negative about the ACA overall. Following the trend of the past, party
affiliation is highly divisive for approval ratings, with “a vast majority of Democrats,
79%, approve of the law, and 69% think it will make the healthcare situation better. In
contrast, 87% of Republicans disapprove of the law, and 77% think it will make the
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healthcare situation worse” (Jones, 2014). Although more Americans receive benefits
from the ACA, the public follows the opinions of party leaders. The overall approval
rating remains close to the disapproval rate, with 54% disapproving and 43% approving.
With the increase of benefits as years go by since the ACA’s original implementation,
approval rating has not changed much. The ACA’s low approval rating stems from the
lack of consideration during the drafting process. With lobbyists and interest groups
constantly making compromises with Congressmen, the electorate’s voice was edged out
of the negotiations. Democrats appear to be happier with the outcome of the legislation
since it was passed during a Democratic controlled Congress, whereas Republicans have
consistently disapproved of the ACA overall. Regardless of the number of Americans
insured, overall approval remains fairly low. The Republicans and the special interest
groups have convinced a majority of the electorate that the details of the ACA are a
problem, which has led to the low approval rate despite the number of insured
Americans.
Conclusion
The surveys taken by Gallup and others consistently show that Americans are
unhappy with the ACA, Republicans more so than Democrats. This is a reflection of the
partisanship experienced during the drafting and passage of the ACA. More than that, it
is a reflection of interests groups controlling legislation through the parties. Democrats
controlled both houses of Congress and the Presidency. Instead of compromising
between parties, Democrats compromised with lobbyists and interest groups. This sort of
compromise has led to many Americans frustrated with what is probably the most
influential piece of legislation to become law in recent years. The high visibility during
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campaigns and priority of health care legislation should have been a prime opportunity
for the electorate to exert their opinions and Congress to pass a piece of legislation of
which the electorate would approve. Instead, the electorate was flooded with coverage of
health care reform while insiders and special interests controlled the details of the ACA.
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Chapter 3: Changes Within
Chapter 3 looks at the changes that have taken place within the institution of
Congress. Polarization in Congress and the changes in how parties work together (or not)
inside of Congress. The reforms in Congress have been attempts to incorporate the
electorate, just as Schattschneider wanted. Part of Schattschneider’s (1975) theory has
come to pass—there have been multiple attempts at widening the scope of conflict to
allow for greater participation of the electorate. These reforms include the shift away
from committee power toward party power, polarization of parties in Congress, and
Congressmen expressing multiple interests. Where they have failed is in the inability of
the electorate to stop elite takeover. This chapter looks at reforms made in Congress
which could have allowed the electorate to control parties, but have failed to do so.
These changes should have allowed for the electorate to determine what happens in
government. Unfortunately, intense policy demanders and interest groups continue to
control the goings-on despite attempts to take away their power. During elections and the
legislation process, the electorate is denied power through the overwhelming influence of
special interests. One example of this is visible in the health care debate—an issue with
which the public was extremely familiar and directly impacted. The electorate should
have been able to determine the outcome of health care reform, but was constantly edged
out by lobbyists and special interest groups swaying legislators.
Schattschneider (1975) believed stronger parties would publicize the scope of
conflict. Parties in America are now extremely polarized on almost every major issue.
The parties hold opposing opinions which are well-known among the electorate. This
polarization between parties is what Schattschneider thought would allow the electorate
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to hold parties accountable. Instead, interest groups continue to drive party behavior.
Even with responsible parties and issues the electorate is familiar with, special interests
find their way to party leaders and members to determine how the party operates.
Reforms in Congress
There have been three major areas of change in Congress: (1) rules procedures
and practices governing how matters reach the floor; (2) changes in the committee
system; (3) changes in leadership instruments (Schickler, 2001). Cohen et al. (2008)
focused on the changes and reforms that have affected the public, the electorate. The
electorate has experienced the greatest change in the implementation of direct primaries.
On the other hand, Schickler (2001) goes in-depth into the internal reforms and their
impacts on Congress as an institution. Of course, the reforms in Congress also have an
impact on the electorate—what happens within Congress impacts the electorate’s views
and votes.
The first claim Schickler (2001) makes is that multiple collective interests
typically shape each important change in Congressional institutions. Many of the
reforms studied showed actors working together among coalitions to implement
institutional reforms which would benefit the whole coalition. One example of this is the
1970 Reorganization Act which was brought about by the cooperation between liberal
Democrats and young Republicans. The Reorganization Act was an attempt to overcome
powerful committees in Congress and make internal workings more transparent to the
public. The passing of the Reorganization Act may seem an unlikely bond, due to the
bipartisanship which would not happen now, but each sub-section of the party had
specific interests that, at the time, overrode the party interests. These interests arose from
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the desire of specific groups to implement particular policies and make the electorate
more aware. Although legislators have and express a variety of interests, they now fall
closely within party lines. As committee chairs lost power, party leaders gained power
which has led to the multiple interests becoming more polarized between strong parties.
The advance of strong parties has led to legislators channeling their multiple
interests through the party. These multiple interests became quite apparent in the
introduction of amendments to the ACA. In the Senate, 506 amendments were proposed
to the Senate’s original version of the ACA. While not all of these were significant
amendments, each one represents some facet of interest held by various Congressmen.
The introduction and passage of amendments convolutes the process and makes
following legislation harder. Although Cannan (2013) argues that this number is
misleading since many were insignificant, the amendments still represent the multiple
interests in Congress. Amendments were made in order to stall, change, and tinker with
the ACA in accordance with the interests held by individual Congressmen. Also, many
of the lobbyists were former Congressmen or former staff members who took their talents
dealing with Congress to the other side. This revolving door of friends and former
colleagues rallying support begs the question of whose interests are truly being
represented with the ACA (Attkisson, 2009). From advocating to lobbying, those
familiar with the system tend to stay within it. In the tightly woven infrastructure of
office-holders and lobbyists, there is no place for the people’s voice.
In the case of the ACA it was a new member in the minority that shifted the
mindset and plan of action for both parties in Congress, particularly in the Senate. With
the death of Ted Kennedy and the special election in Massachusetts bringing a
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Republican into his seat, the Democratic Party and Senator Reid in particular felt an acute
need to get the ACA to pass more swiftly than before. Iowa Republican Senator Chuck
Grassley used his position in the Finance Committee to wield a modicum of the
conservative view on the ACA (Schouten, 2009). His position made him a target for
lobbyists who wanted to reach out to the Republicans who were actively seeking
bipartisan legislation. While denying any unfounded influence, lobbyists donated heavily
to Grassley, who ultimately voted against the ACA. These concerns are among those
which caused Majority Leader Reid to push the ACA through as quickly as possible,
particularly after the Democrats lost the seat needed for an assured supermajority in the
Senate.
Another claim made by Schickler (2001) is that Congressional institutions
typically develop through an accumulation of innovations that are inspired by competing
motives, which engenders a tense layering of new arrangements on top of preexisting
structures. What this means is that it is easier to add to existing arrangements than to
dismantle old structures. This allows interested groups to achieve their goals without
completely overturning the existing institutional structures. Schickler (2001) says,
“Institutions develop through superimposing new arrangements on top of preexisting
structures designed to serve different purposes” (pp. 190-193). Even (or perhaps
especially) with aspects as complex as the budget, adding new parts to what already
exists is easier to accomplish than cutting out entirely what already exists. The addition
of new things on top of the old also makes it more difficult for the electorate to
distinguish the old from the new. It is easier within the institution, but creates a dense
layer of complexity which is not conducive to transparency.
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One of the most prominent aspects of persuasion within Congress is the high
number of lobbyists who get involved in major pieces of legislation. The complexity of a
bill is only increased when a great number of Congressmen are influenced by a large
variety of lobbyists. Lobbyists were spending exorbitant amounts of money trying to get
specific things added into the bill. Pharmaceutical lobbyists spent millions trying to
protect their industry’s business. Toward the end lobbyists began focusing on small
changes to the content instead of complete opposition. “Big pieces of legislation
typically require what one top lobbyist called ‘refinements or improvements or
corrections,” which can be done at any point, right up to the last second (Yeager, 2013).
Some legislators and lobbyists sought major changes and outright rejection of the bill, but
the reality came in smaller changes to drafts maintaining a consistent them of an overhaul
of the health care structure.
During the negotiations, the American Hospital Association (AHA) “spent more
than $7 million dollars on its Washington lobbying campaign, ranked near the top
spending in the industry” (AHA, 2015). The association represents many hospitals
during legislation processes and through health care reform. The AHA also had “a team
of 28 lobbyists and the AHA also makes significant contributions to members of
Congress and congressional candidates” (AHA, 2015). This is exactly the kind of
influence which ousts the electorate’s voices. The AHA is one of the many special
interests which lobbied and donated during the drafting and negotiations of the ACA.
These special interests were heard much louder than any opinion of the public’s.
The last claim Schickler (2001) makes is that the adoption of a series of changes
intended to promote one type of interest typically will provoke contradictory changes that
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promote competing interests. When one group achieves enough power to promote solely
their specific interest, such as with the role of the Speaker, there is often a backlash from
those who oppose that specific interest. This principle helps explain the constant rise and
decline of power of the Speaker throughout the years. An early example is Reed
centralizing the Speaker’s power in the 1890s, only to have the power diminish when
Henderson took office. Then, with Cannon’s election in 1903, the Speakership gained
much of its power back. This constant flux of power in one position reflects the specific
interests of various groups competing and getting what they want, one at a time, causing
an ebb and flow in this position. The position is dominated by individuals who are bound
to the special interest groups who form the foundation of the party structure. Not just
with the Speaker, but with a small group of legislators who promote their special interests
above all others is the ebb and flow of power is driven by the special interest groups who
demand particular policies.
The addition of amendments and changes made make the content of the bill
somewhat difficult for the electorate to follow. The Senate made changes on the House
original and the House made changes to the Senate variation of the ACA, which increases
the difficulty of following and understanding the final bill. Lobbyists attempting to
attach last-minute changes to amendments were adamant in their efforts. The health care
industry is a major lobbyist sector and one of the heaviest donors in the nation. The ACA
was a prime lobbying opportunity for this group of special interests. Advocacy and
lobbying were prominent for years during and after the passage of the ACA. Some of
those who had originally worked within Congress to pass the bill eventually lobbied for
health care companies in various capacities. Those who worked with Congressmen to
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draft the legislation are highly coveted for their knowledge and connection. One such
staffer “is Yvette Fontenot, who wrote key elements of the Affordable Care Act while a
Senate staffer and then worked on the law at the White House and the Department of
Health and Human Services” (Yeager, 2013). Fontenot now advises a range of health
care lobbying groups. This is a deep-founded connection which exhibits no consideration
of the electorate—only the health care industry.
All of these institutional changes only change the way in which Congress
works—they did not impact the electorate directly. At the end of the day, each
Congressman does have the goal of getting elected which essentially depends upon the
electorate. Interest groups want particular policies and office-seekers want to win
elections so they work together to achieve these goals. Despite changes to the structure,
both special interest groups and office-seekers find a way to work around the electorate
and accomplish their goals. However, candidates’ interests are greater than simply
election or reelection. The bulk of their multiple interests is policy-oriented, which the
electorate is almost never directly involved in. The problem is policy goals of officeholders are intricately tied to the special interest groups represented by their party, and
“the evidence from each period [of institutional change] provides strong support for the
claim that multiple collective interests shape institutional change” (Theriault, 2003, p.
249). Multiple collective interests force compromise, but compromise among those in
politics, not those outside the institution.
Institutional Change
In his article “The Case of the Vanishing Moderates,” Theriault (2003) discusses
several institutional changes which have led to polarization. He looks at Congress over
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time, not simply from one Congress to the next. One Congress to the next shows little
change, but chronological assessments demonstrate much greater change. By looking
through changes over time, Theriault’s (2003) story helps show that despite reforms in
the institutions, the electorate has not been able to grab hold of power. One such change
he discusses has been the increased usage of restrictive House rules. Using restrictive
rules in the House has made it more difficult for the minority party and moderates of both
parties to influence legislation. The majority party implements rules which do not allow
for amendments or debate on a bill in the House or when it reaches the Senate. However,
Theriault (2003) makes it clear that restrictive House rules only explain some of the
story. Restrictive rules are one way in which party powerhouses prevent anybody outside
the majority or anybody who strays from House leaders from being able to influence
legislation.
These kinds of restrictive rules are often used in Congress, particularly with major
legislation. The ACA experienced restrictive rules in the form of limited debate time,
used by the Democratic majority to limit the impact Republican members could have on
changing, stalling, or stopping the bill. Health care reform was one of President Obama’s
primary goals upon election and he sought to start the process of change almost
immediately. President Obama offered vague guidelines and espoused broad goals for
changing the health care system as a whole. Health care reform legislation was referred
to three committees in the House in early 2009, beginning the multifaceted process of
creating a single piece of health care legislation which would pass both chambers, as well
as achieving President Obama’s goals.
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Another change that has occurred is that there are now more ideological issues
than in the 1960s and 1970s. Which issues are salient to the public (and the issues being
discussed within parties and the legislature) are more ideological than at almost any point
in the past. Government spending has been one of the largest areas of concern in recent
Congresses. This issue is one that is deeply divided down party lines, with Democrats
and Republicans almost always at odds with each other with little overlap between
parties. The ACA became a highly ideological battle in Congress. Democrats held both
chambers and the Presidency, making passage possible, but Republicans still expressed
their displeasure with the bill. The parties were clearly divided on this issue, but the
electorate was edged out of the negotiation process by special interests and elites.
One of the most significant advantages in the Senate is having a filibuster-proof
majority. When the 111th Congress began, the Democrats held a super majority in the
Senate, while maintaining a simple majority in the House. This was an ideal time to
introduce and pass legislation that would potentially not pass in a more evenly divided
partisan circumstance. The Democratic Party saw this as perhaps the only opportunity to
implement the ACA with the smallest amount of compromise with the Republican Party
who simply wanted to stop anything the Democratic Party proposed. There was enough
Democrats in the Senate to prevent a filibuster on the floor, and the Democrats could
focus on achieving a majority vote in the House. However, when a Republican won the
Senate seat in the wake of Ted Kennedy’s death, the threat of a highly partisan,
ideological war was close on the horizon.
With the loss of the supermajority in the Senate, the Democratic Party had to
figure out how to pass the ACA. The Democrats in the House did not want to pass the
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Senate bill exactly as it was, so the Senate had to find a way to get the bill passed. To
pass the ACA, the Senate implemented reconciliation. Reconciliation is a special
procedure that is not often used. Using reconciliation placed limits on the ACA: in the
House, the bill was limited to the number of amendments that could be made; in the
Senate, the bill had to be germane to the budget (Cannan, 2013). These restrictive rules
of reconciliation used by the Democratic Party solidified the fact that the ACA would not
be bipartisan—using reconciliation takes away the power of the minority to negotiate
with the majority. Having drafted the legislation with White House insiders and
Democratic leaders, the House bill passed, with slight revisions, in the Senate. It was then
sent back to the House, which passed the Senate’s version. The reconciliation process
was used to bypass the Republican minority and bring together the Democratic majority
in order to pass the ACA. Democratic party leaders brought together their coalition to
unify in the battle over health care reform.
Institutional changes have led to party leaders becoming explicitly ideological.
Party leaders are upfront in their ideology instead of attempting to conceal or moderate
their ideology. Discussion and prominence of ideological issues has aided in the explicit
ideology of party leaders. New members of the legislature are elected with certain
ideological tendencies. Returning members of the legislature shift their ideologies
toward party leaders. Returning members shift their ideologies largely due to the pressure
to conform to party lines within Congress and to keep steady the party platform and
image as a cohesive unit. With an issue like the ACA, party leaders developed and
espoused clear opinions either in favor or opposed to the passage of this health care
legislation. With new members being elected further right or left, and returning members
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shifting their positions, the divide between Republicans and Democrats on the ACA
showed the deeply partisanship of the bill.
The Gingrich Effect
Gingrich Senators are defined by Theriault (2013) as those who served in the
House with Newt Gingrich then transferred to the Senate. These Congressmen comprise
a relatively extreme group of conservative Republicans. They are so named for their
history in the House, serving for a variety of time spans with Representative Newt
Gingrich. Gingrich was the key Representative responsible for shifting the Republican
Party further to the right during his tenure in the House. He motivated others in his party
to shift to the right, further away from the Democratic Party. The separation is how the
electorate should be able to hold parties accountable. The shift of the parties away from
each other is indicative of responsible, strong parties. Gingrich’s reign in the House
instigated the move of the parties away from each other, resulting in a highly partisan
Congress as former House members moved to the Senate.
Theriault (2003) pinpoints the change in Congress from individual to partisan
with the Gingrich Senators, saying, “The Gingrich Senators, almost single-handedly at
first, propelled party polarization and escalated partisan warfare in the Senate” (p. 16). It
was with the highly partisan Gingrich Senators that others began to retaliate, solidifying
the partisanship of Senators as a whole. Gingrich Senators are more conservative than
others in the Republican Party, which has solicited a more liberal stance from some in the
Democratic Party. As Gingrich and his cohorts attempted to push legislation to the right,
the left experienced a similar, though less extreme push. The Democratic Senators were
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led by Gephardt as they tried to rally against the Gingrich Senators. Gingrich and
Gephardt led the path of the parties diverging within Congress.
Gingrich got his beginning in the House, in the time when the Republican Party
was seen as a permanent minority. Republicans had been the minority for such a long
time that Democratic majority was expected to continue indefinitely. Republicans in the
House worked with the Democrats to create bipartisan legislation—if the Republicans
could not hold a majority, at least they were still able to influence policy. Gingrich was
not immediately a powerful player in the attempt to move to the right. When Wright was
elected Speaker, Gingrich went so far in his criticism he was practically standing alone.
Then Gingrich became the Minority Whip (against the minority leader’s endorsement)
and his formerly controversial tactics became a more common practice. Wright stepped
down, and in 1994, Gingrich became the Speaker. This is where Gingrich gained a more
conservative following.
When Gingrich Senators came to prominence in Congress, the Republican right
became more extreme than the Democratic left and Gingrich Senators were further from
other Republicans than Gephardt Senators were from other Democrats. Theriault (2013)
traces the partisan move almost entirely back to Gingrich and his influence over fellow
Republicans in the House, who eventually transferred to the Senate. Other institutional
changes impacted Congress as well, but the Gingrich effect is the single most influential
factor in the polarization of parties within Congress. The pack mentality was higher
among Gingrich Senators which led Republicans to have a much more partisan, and
conservative, voting record. Democrats did not exhibit such partisan behavior or liberal
voting records comparable to the conservative records of the Republicans. According to
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Theriault (2013), the Gingrich effect (Republican Senators voting with extreme
partisanship and conservativism), does not fade over a Senator’s career, and is strongly
affected by when individual Senators were first elected to the House. Entrance to the
House matters more than transfer to the Senate. The Gingrich effect impacted members
who transferred from House to Senate so significantly that it caused a partisan shift
across all of Congress. The partisan shift caused responsible parties, but did not increase
public influence. The strong parties, according to Schattschneider (1975), should have
taken power away from interest groups and given it to the public.
Since the first Gingrich Senator went from the House to the Senate, more of the
Republican Party and Republican leadership has held Gingrich Senators. The Gingrich
Era made individuals more likely to try for a seat in the Senate and more likely to keep
their seat once in the Senate. Representatives moved in greater numbers to the Senate
and some of these Representatives-turned-Senators became part of the Republican
leadership. The Gingrich Senator effect cannot be explained simply by House members
running for Senate positions in this era. Theriault says the Gingrich Era turned Downs’
theory on its head (Theriault, 2003). Downs’ theory of the Median Voter suggests that
each party converges on the median voter in order to win the support of a majority of
voters. Parties shift their stances based on the median of voters’ stances. The graphic
(Figure 1) below represents Downs’ theory of party convergence on the median voter.
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Figure 1. Downs’ Median Voter Theorum
[Mackenzie. The University of Delaware. Public Choice and Government Failure.
http://www.udel.edu/johnmack/frec406/govt_failure.html]

Instead of converging upon the median voter, Republicans running for Senate won seats
at higher rates by being more extreme in their opinions. Gingrich Senators: (1) raise
more campaign funds than other Republicans; (2) are more electorally secure; (3) are
more likely to change the Senate than be changed by the Senate (Theriault, 2003).
Although the electorate did not share the immensely conservative opinions, Republicans
won, and kept, seats by being extremely partisan. Gingrich Senators won elections
because they were supported by interest groups and activists—not the electorate.
Gingrich Senators are also the reason behind confrontational partisanship and
stalemate. Gingrich Senators, far more than other Republicans, lead the way against
nominations and policy presented by Democrats. They used filibustering as a means to
stop the Democrat majority from passing legislation. Whereas House members prior to
the Gingrich era would work with the Democrats to create bipartisan legislation, Senate
members during and after the Gingrich era worked against Democrats to stop unwanted
legislation. Gingrich Senators are also less likely to cosponsor Democratic bills and more
likely to stop the process of normal things. The lines are clearly drawn between
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Democrats and Republicans with Republicans being the most obvious partisan warriors.
The obvious split between partisans was only increased during the 2010 election which
say the election of many Tea Party candidates. Tea Party members were even more
distant from other Republicans than Gingrich Senators, which served to increase the
distinction between Democrats and Republicans. Through the election of Gingrich
Senators and Tea Party members, “the entire institution of the Senate was, indeed,
different because of them” (Theriault, 2003, p. 170). Both groups of Senators actively
sought to promote extremely conservative policies while blocking anything brought forth
by the Democrats. The House was influenced as well, but tends to be more polarized in
general. The Senate in particular experienced major changes in operations due to the
increased polarization of the parties within the institution. The Gingrich effect of moving
parties away from each other led to the polarization which was needed for the electorate
to gain power from the special interests which dominated in the era of strong committees.
When there is obvious differences, parties should be accountable to the public, but even
after the Gingrich effect moved parties away from each other, the public was not able to
hold parties accountable.
During the House’s and the Senate’s instigation and consideration of health care
reform, the bitter rivalry between parties, which was an asset to Republicans while they
were the majority, became a great asset to the Democratic majority. With only a minority
in both chambers of Congress, the Republicans could not do much to halt the passage of
the ACA. It did not, however, stop them from vocalizing their opinions against the bill
or the impact they believed it would have on Americans. In the House, minority views
were quickly dismissed in the general assembly. In the Senate, Majority Leader Harry
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Reid worked behind closed doors with party leaders and White House insiders to create a
plan that was best for the party and the President. However, the Senate does not allow
for such easy domination by the majority as the House. In the Senate, it required a
supermajority to limit the hours of debate and number of amendments. These restrictions
on the minority coupled with the changes in Congress during recent years, created a
turbulent atmosphere in which the ACA had to operate.
After Passage
The healthcare bill was a hugely partisan endeavor of the most recent Congresses.
The Affordable Care Act was signed into law by President Obama in 2010. The bill was
sponsored by a Democrat and co-sponsored by 40 Democrats and 3 Republicans. The
fact that there is an overwhelming number of Democrats co-sponsoring the bill gives
some indication of the difficulty of Republicans’ ability to achieve any sort of bipartisan
compromise. For the first two years of the President’s term, Congress was majority
Democratic.

The ACA is colloquially named Obamacare, and is generally viewed as

the brainchild of President Obama. It was originally passed in the House in October of
2009, about a month after its introduction. It passed the Senate with changes in
December of 2009. The bill bounced between the House and the Senate in several
different forms before one all-inclusive bill could be decided upon. From introduction in
the House to signage by the President, the process took a year and a half, passing just a
few months before Republicans would gain majority in the House.
Although the bill passed in 2010, its implementation was delayed until 2011. The
reason for this was not some concern brought forth by constituents as the individual
mandate was not delayed, but businesses saying they needed more time to comply with
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the mandate to provide coverage for employees (Yeager, 2013). This did not, however,
open up debate about the actual content of the ACA, but merely shifted the time
constraint to allow business longer to meet the legislation’s standards. Some companies
did ask for a repeal, but most seeking it understood that repeal or upheaval would not
occur in the existing political environment. Perhaps it was necessary courtesy to allow
businesses an extra year before enforcing the ACA, but the question remains whether or
not businesses were buying time and lawmakers agreed, despite electorate needs.
In 2013, advocates predicted that implementation would take multiple years.
Scott DeFife predicted three to seven years for some businesses to be able to fully
integrate the new standards into their employees’ health care packages saying, “People
understand that some of these very detailed elements in the law may not jibe” (Yeager,
2013). Again, it is understandable to need time to adjust to legislation that has such a
large impact on businesses and employees, but taking seven years to fully implement the
legislation could create struggles for individuals and delegitimizes any incentive to
implement the measures immediately. By extending the timeline of implementation, the
government is extending favor to businesses and lobbyists over the constituents they are
bound to serve.
Conclusion
In conclusion, reforms have been attempted both within the institution and with
the electorate to allow the public control over government. The attempts at expanding
the scope of conflict, as Schattschneider (1975) wanted, have not led to the electorate
being able to hold parties accountable. Schattschneider thought that responsible parties
would mean public debate and accountability. While the American system now has two
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distinct parties, special interests continue to dominate what parties do. Instead, the
reforms have continued to allow special interests and intense policy demanders to
determine the action of parties. Health care reform was started for the public, but the
ACA was drafted in accordance to the wishes of special interests—not the electorate.
This legislation demonstrates that the electorate is kept blind to what the parties are doing
in Congress. Special interests continue to dominate party governance, while the
electorate plays along through the primary season without actually being in control of
parties.
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